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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Appellant challenges an "Order And Judgment" filed
October 15, 1982 that was a final order on the alter ego issue.
May an appellant seeks review of that final order or judgment
more than two years after it was made?

Or should the appellant

have filed a notice of his intention to appeal as provided by
Rule 72(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure that were then in
effect?
2.

If the appeal on the alter ego issue is considered on

its merits, was the ruling of the lower court correct when it
found that Dixie Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of
Darrell G. Hafen?

In the usual case, the alter ego doctrine, or

piercing the corporate veil, is applied to reach the personal
assets of the person using the corporation improperly.

But may

piercing the corporate veil be applied "backwards", that is, to
reach assets placed in a corporation to collect a personal debt,
if the corporation is one where practically none of the corporate
formalities have been observed and the corporation is dominated
and controlled by one individual who incurred the debt in his
individual capacity?
3.

Did all the defendants make a general appearance in

court on the first writ of attachment?

Did such general

appearance make actual personal service of process or notice of
hearing on the writ unnecessary?

Did the court therefore err in

dissolving the first writ of attachment?

Even if the first writ

was properly dissolved, wasnft there a second writ properly

5

issued, served, and hearing had thereon?

Or did the court err in

granting the writ of attachment?
4.

May an attorney's lien be impressed on property that

does not belong to the attorney's client?

Was the attorney's

lien filed before the court had ruled that the attached funds
were not the client's assets, but the assets of Darrell G. Hafen?
If so, and even if the attorney's lien is valid, were there any
funds to attach?

Had Dixie's attorney filed an answer containing

a counterclaim at any time prior to filing his alleged lien?

Was

there a verdict, report, decision, or judgment in his client's
favor?

Transamerica contends all these questions must be

answered in the affirmative before a valid attorney's lien is
created.

The proper answer to these questions is "no", and

therefore, no valid attorney's lien ever arose.
5.

Was summary judgment proper?

Has appellant presented on

appeal any genuine issue on any material fact?
76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code apply?

Does Section

If so, isn't it conclusive

on the issues of liability and amount of damages?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant Dixie Power And Water, Inc. appeals from an
"Order Granting Summary Judgment" to the plaintiffs following a
hearing on November 21, 1984. Appellant also seeks review of an
"Order And Judgment" filed October 15, 1982 which held that
appellant was the alter ego of the individual defendant Darrell
G. Hafen and that appellant's assets were in fact the assets of
Hafen.

Appellant also challenges the issuance of a writ of
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attachment and asserts that his attorney has a valid attorney's
lien on the attached funds. Respondent seeks to uphold the
rulings of the lower court.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Transamerica Cash Reserve (Transamerica) is a money
market mutual fund that sells shares to the public, invests those
proceeds in short-term investments, and passes the income on to
its investors or shareholders (T 18). First National Bank of
Boston is the transfer agent for Transamerica (T 20).
On September 21, 1981, defendant Darrell G. Hafen
(Hafen) opened an account with Transamerica (T 22), and between
that date and December 31, 1981, Hafen made 22 deposits (share
purchases) totaling $1,465,000.00. Of these deposits, only
$12,000.00 were good.

Meanwhile, Hafen made 20 redemptions, or

checks, and obtained $406,380.75 in cash, leaving Transamerica
with a net loss of $394,380.75. Transamerica was able to recover
all but $93,426.59 of this loss through banking channels. (T
39-41, 47; Exhibit P-l). All of the deposits were admitted into
evidence (Exhibit P-3), as were all of the check redemptions
(Exhibit P-4). Summary judgment for $93,426.59 was granted at a
hearing on November 21, 1984 (R 506) and the judgment was filed
December 3, 1984 (R 507-509).
Hafen was prosecuted and convicted of mail fraud in the
United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in
Criminal No. 82 00053, on the same deposits that pertain to this
action (R 476-503) .
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Transamerica commenced this civil action on February 5,
1982, filing a verified complaint (R 1-27), a motion for a
prejudgment writ of attachment (R 3 0 ) , the required undertaking
(R 28-29) , and obtained a writ of attachment that was served on
First Security Bank (R 32-35) where funds were on deposit under
the name of Dixie Power And Water, Inc. (Dixie), a corporation
alleged in the complaint to be the alter ego of Hafen.

The funds

were placed in an interest bearing account (R 39) by the clerk of
the court.
The hearing on the prejudgment writ of attachment came
on for hearing February 11, 1982, but was continued at Hafenfs
request until March 9, 1982 (R 37-38).

On March 9, 1982,

Defendants appeared by counsel, Fay E. Reber, and moved for a
continuance to April 13, 1982.

Transamerica stipulated to said

continuance, and the court entered its "Order Continuing Hearing"
on March 11, 1982, and continued the writ (R 50-51).

On April

13, 1982, the day set for hearing, attorney Scott A. Gubler
appeared for Dixie and filed documents objecting to the writ.
The hearing was again continued to May 10th by agreement (R 64,
84-85).

On May 10, 1982, the court heard the testimony of John

Hafen, the son of Darrell G. Hafen (D 3:16-20), who had given his
deposition in this matter on May 7, 1982.

At the May 10th

hearing, the court found that Darrell G. Hafen, the President of
Dixie (D. 4:12), failed to appear for his deposition scheduled
for May 7, 1982, and ordered him to appear for the taking of his
deposition on May 21, 1982, and continued the writ (R 69-71).
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On May 20, 1982, Attorney Scott A. Gubler filed his
affidavit in which he states that Hafen had resigned as President
of Dixie on or about May 14, 1982 because Hafen thought his
refusal to attend the deposition could bring sanctions against
Dixie (R 81-82).

On May 18, 1982, Transamerica requested the

court to rule, based upon the testimony of John Hafen at the May
10, 1982 hearing, that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen (R
73-74) . Appellant has not obtained a transcript of this
testimony as part of the record on appeal. Transamerica also
moved for default judgment on the grounds that all Defendants had
made general appearances by counsel but had not filed an answer
to the complaint (R 75-76) .
The matter came on for hearing on June 8, 1982, and the
parties presented their arguments. The court ruled, based on the
file and the testimony of John Hafen, that Dixie was the alter
ego of Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were the assets of
Hafen.

John Hafen1s testimony of May 10, 1982 has not been made

part of the record on appeal. Without that record to review on
appeal, this court cannot second guess or question the lower
court's finding that Dixie was, in fact, the alter ego of Hafen
and that the purported assets of Dixie were, in fact, the assets
of Hafen.

The court requested Transamerica's attorneys to

prepare the findings and judgment on the alter ego issue.
At the same June 8, 1982 hearing, the court also ruled
that the writ should be dissolved because notice was not properly
served on Dixie as required by Rule 64A(7) U.R.C.P. (R 167-168) ,
even though Dixie had actual notice and its counsel had made
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several appearances in the matter.
attorney to prepare this order.

The court requested Dixie's

Proposed findings and judgments

were prepared by Dixie (R 155-156, 169-170), and by Transamerica
(R 157, 160-164).

Dixie filed objections to Transamerica1s

documents (R 165-166) , and Transamerica filed objections to
Dixie's documents (R 158-159).
Because of the June 8, 1982 ruling dissolving this
first writ of attachment, Transamerica immediately sought, on
June 9, 1982, a second writ of attachment (R 152-154).

The judge

held these documents, along with many others, in the file in his
chambers until October 15, 1982. This explains why the record
shows all these documents being filed with the clerk on October
15, 1982, which was when the court finally made some decisions in
this matter.

In the meantime, personal service of the summons

and complaint on all Defendants was obtained on June 10, 1982
when Darrell G. Hafen was served in custody at the Terminal
Island Correction Facility (R 96-98).

On July 2, 1982, Hafen

filed an answer for all Defendants (R 99-103) , even though Mr.
Gubler also claimed to be representing Dixie.

In this answer,

Hafen claimed he was President of both corporate Defendants,
despite Mr. Gublerfs affidavit that Hafen had resigned (R 81-82)
as President of Dixie on May 14, 1982.
On July 14, 1982, the objections to the form of the
findings and judgments or orders were considered, and the court
signed in open court (Tl 4:11-18) the documents that reflected
its rulings of June 8, 1982 on both the alter ego issue (R
171-174) and the dissolution of the first writ of attachment (R
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under advisement and continued until an October 15, 1982 hearing,
at which time the court ruled that the attorney's lien claimed by
Scott A. Gubler should be impressed on the attached funds (R
150-151; 177).
The court also ruled that a new Writ Of Attachment
should issue, and did issue such writ, which was served on the
Clerk of the court October 19, 1982 as the present custodian of
the funds.

The hearing thereon was scheduled for October 25,

1982 (R 190-191), but continued by the court to October 27, 1982
(R 182-183).

A new undertaking was secured and filed (R 181).

Also on October 15, 1982, the same day as the Order was
made, Transamerica moved to amend, pursuant to Rule 59(a) (7)
U.R.C.P., the ruling impressing the attorney's lien on the
grounds that such a ruling was an error in law and contrary to
the court's prior ruling that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen
and that Dixie's purported assets were in fact the assets of
Hafen (R 178-179) .

Transamerica argued that this prior ruling

prevented the lien from attaching to funds not belonging to Mr.
Gubler's client.

The court issued its "Order For Stay" October

15, 1982, preventing the Clerk from releasing the funds to
satisfy the claimed attorney's lien until further order of the
court (R 180).
At the October 27, 1982 hearing on the Writ Of
Attachment, the court heard the testimony of Transamerica's
treasurer regarding Hafen's account and heard the testimony of
John Hafen, son of Darrell G. Hafen, and took the matter under
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as Judge Burns seldom opens court prior to 10:00 a.m.

As ordered

by the court, counsel for both parties appeared at the time and
place ordered, but Judge Burns failed to appear.

Finally, at the

risk of incurring the wrath of the court, Transamerica filed a
"Demand For Ruling" on July 3, 1985. The matter came on for
hearing Monday, July 8, 1985. As shown by the minute entry for
said date, the court wanted to see counsel in chambers Thursday
or Friday, July 11 or 12, 1985. However, before that could be
done, the court prepared and executed its "Order Striking
Proposed Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law" the next day,
July 9, 1985. This document was filed with the clerk the next
day.

Apparently, this is the court's ruling on Dixie's

post-judgment motions.
That appeal was eventually dismissed on this very
basis, see Transamerica Cash Reserve v. Hafen 39 Utah Adv. Rep.
33 (8/05/86) . The case was remanded to the trial court for
proper disposition of Dixie's motion to amend the judgment. On
September 9, 1986, upon motion and hearing, the trial court
denied the post-judgment motions of the defendants, as reflected
in an order signed September 17, 1986. Notice of the entry of
that order was given to defendants by mail on September 18, 1986.
Dixie then filed a timely "Notice of Appeal" on October 1, 1986,
but all other defendants, including Hafen, have failed to appeal.
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be

_ ohn :ia er was

the secretary of Dixie, yet he knew almost nothing about its
corporate affairs.

His lack of knowledge, manifested in his

deposition, is typical of instances where the corporate shell has
been pierced as a facade or "pocketbook" of a dominant
stockholder.

The corporate veil is properly pierced "backwards"

when an individual incurs substantial personal liability and
keeps himself insolvent by holding his major assets in
corporations that he treats as his own pocketbook.

In such

cases, it is proper to pierce the corporate veil and hold that
the corporate assets are really the assets of the individual,
which was exactly what the lower court held (R 171-174) .
The trial court issued a writ of attachment that was
later dissolved because it was not served as required by Rule
64A(7) U.R.C.P., but that rule only requires that the notice
gives "the adverse party actual notice of the proceeding. . .".
In this case, all defendants had actual notice of the hearing to
be held on the writ of attachment.

This is evident from the fact

that all defendants appeared by counsel in the matter prior to
the hearings held May 10, 1982 and June 8, 1982. Thus, the
original writ should not have been dissolved.

Further, as soon

as it was dissolved, Transamerica filed a written motion for a
new writ and then moved in open court (on July 14, 1982) for a
new writ of attachment.
notice to Dixie.

Thus, the second writ was secured with

This motion was taken under advisement by the

court until it was granted on October 15, 1982. Notice was
properly given and hearing thereon held.
in the second writ of attachment.
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ARGUMENTS
I.

RULE 73(a) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(NOW RULES 3 AND 4 U.R.A.P.) PRECLUDE THE APPEAL
ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE SINCE THAT "ORDER AND
JUDGMENT" WAS FILED OCTOBER 15, 1982 AND NO
APPEAL WAS TAKEN WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED.
The key issue on Dixie's appeal is the ruling that

Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen.

Unless Dixie can upset this

ruling, Dixie's argument and claim for an attorney's lien must
also fail because an attorney's lien is good only against
property of the attorney's client (see Point IV, infra), and if
the alter ego ruling stands, the rest of Dixie's arguments
likewise fail because it is Hafen, and not Dixie, that has
standing to appeal any other issues.

However, Hafen has not

filed any appeal in this case.
Transamerica contends that the appeal is not timely on
the alter ego issue, and that the appeal must therefore be
dismissed.

The "Order And Judgment" on the alter ego issue was

made June 8, 1982, signed July 14, 1982 and filed October 15,
1982 (R 171-172).

The wording of the judgment stated:

"IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED, That the
purported corporate entity, Dixie Power and Water,
Inc. is the alter ego of Darrell Hafen and the assets
purportedly owned by said Dixie Power and Water, Inc.
are the assets of Defendant Darrell Hafen."
This was clearly a final judgment on the alter ego issue.

From

and after this ruling, Dixie had no further interest or stake in
the lawsuit.

The" assets Dixie claimed had been adjudged to

belong to Hafen.

No other issues in the lawsuit involved Dixie,

only Hafen and the remaining defendants.

Dixie's remedy was

either an immediate appeal on that issue or the filing of a
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only

the

heading or frank of these documents, and the amendment was
allowed (R 237), as reported in T2 3:7-14, as follows:
"THE COURT: Now, next, you have a "Motion to Amend the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law," that is
strictly to strike your frank from the pleading?
MR. GUBLER: That is correct.
THE COURT: You can either retype it without your name
on them or you can take a pencil and scratch it out.
MR. GUBLER: Thank you, your Honor."
Dixie's attorney apparently did not care to pursue it further, as
the documents were never retyped nor was his frank scratched out
on the documents.

No other objection was ever filed to amend or

change the "Order And Judgment" that Dixie was the alter ego of
Hafen.

Therefore, objections going to that ruling, or which

collaterally attack that ruling, especially on appeal where no
notice of appeal of that issue was filed for more than two years
after its entry, should be disregarded as untimely and final.

II.

THE COURT'S RULING ON THE ALTER EGO ISSUE WAS
CORRECT.
The doctrine that a corporation is a legal entity

separate and apart from the individuals controlling it is a legal
theory introduced for purposes of convenience and to subserve the
ends of justice.

If the concept is extended beyond its reason

and policy, or when invoked in support of an end subversive of
this policy, it will be disregarded by the courts and the
corporation and the individuals controlling it will be treated as
identical.

See Stine v. Girola 9 Utah 2d 22, 337 P.2d 62 (1959),

46 ALR3d 428, and 18 Am.Jur.2d Corporations Section 14, page 559.
Dixie contends on this appeal that the alter ego
doctrine cannot be used to pierce the corporate veil unless the

corporation has committed some kind of fraud, acting through an
agent, such as a major shareholder, a director, or an officer.
Dixie correctly states that disregard of the corporate entity is
most commonly applied where an individual creates a corporation
and then does acts (i.e., commits a fraud) within the corporation
giving a third party a cause of action, and then unlawfully uses
the corporation to shield him from personal liability.

But Dixie

is wrong when it argues that the alter ego doctrine cannot be
used when an individual has incurred personal liability but seeks
to avoid his creditor's claims by holding all his assets in a
corporation, at least where the individual totally disregards
corporate formalities and the corporation is nothing more than
the individual's "incorporated pocketbook".
Dixie asks this court to reconsider the lower court's
ruling of June 8, 1982 that Dixie is the alter ego of Hafen and
that its assets are really the assets of Darrell Hafen. They
want to claim the assets were not subject to prejudgment
attachment for Hafen's fraudulent and criminal liability to
Transamerica.

However, Dixie has not obtained a transcript of

the May 10, 1982 hearing upon which the lower court's ruling was
based.

Without that transcript, this court cannot adequate

review that decision, even though this court does have the
"Deposition of John Hafen" (Exhibit P-20) , the alleged secretary
of Dixie.
But even if this court looks only to that transcript
and the Court pleadings, there is ample reason to uphold the
ruling.

First, Darrell G. Hafen was the President of Dixie, but
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refused to submit to a deposition (R 69-71).

Upon being ordered

to submit to a deposition, he resigned as President of Dixie by a
telephone call to Dixie's attorney (R 81-82).

Yet, a month

later, without any further corporation action or meetings, he
files an answer with the court (R 99-103) in which he states he
is again the President of Dixie.
games with the court.

Mr. Darrell G. Hafen is playing

He is President when he wants to be, but

isn't when it is uncomfortable or inconvenient.
With the deposition of John Hafen, the son of Darrell G.
Hafen, and the alleged "secretary" of Dixie, we have more than
ample reason to disregard the corporation.

John Hafen stated in

his deposition that he did not know if there was a vice president
(D 4:13-14); that he was not aware that as secretary he was
supposed to keep the corporate records (D 4:15-18); that he did
not keep the records and did not know who did (D 4:19-23); that
he did not know if there was a treasurer (D 4:26-29); that he was
"appointed" secretary by Darrell Hafen (D 5:1-3); that he did not
know the date of this alleged "appointment" (D 5:4-9) but that he
did not get "appointed" at a stockholders' meeting (D 5:10-15);
that there had been two meetings of stockholders, but these
alleged meetings were on Christmas day and there are no minutes
of them, or of any stockholders' meetings for that matter (D
5:16-28); that he did not know the last time that a directors'
meeting had been held (D 5:29-31 & 6:1-8); that he knew of no
directors' meetings that had ever been held (D 6:9-11); that he
knew of no other meetings of stockholders or directors that
Darrell Hafen had ever held (D 6:12-30); that he did not even
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know what the word "directors" meant in the context of a
corporation (D 9:9-15); that all the corporate stock was given to
the shareholders—no one paid anything for their stock (D 11:29
to 13:15); that he had never sent a notice of stockholders1
meeting to any of the stockholders (D 13:16-19); that no notice
was sent to stockholders regarding the two alleged "stockholders'
meetings" held on Christmas day (D 13:20 to 14:3); that he did
not even know who the "directors" of Dixie were (D 14:8-15); that
he had never prepared minutes of any meetings (D 14:15-16); that
there was no corporate authorization to open Dixie's bank
accounts at either Sun Captial Bank or First Security Bank (D
14:17 to 16:7); that he did not know how many signatures were
required to withdraw funds from Dixie's account (D 16:8-10); that
it was his father's idea to open the account (D 16:14-15); that
Dixie hired an attorney (Mr. Gubler) to represent the
corporation, but that there was no directors' meeting or other
corporate authorization to do so, but that Darrell Hafen took it
upon himself to hire counsel (D 17:15-30); that he didn't like
the attitude of a bank officer at Sun Capital Bank and took it
upon himself to transfer the funds to a new account at First
Security Bank, without any corporate authorization (D 21:1-15);
that no tax returns have ever been filed by Dixie (D 29:21 to
30:9); that he withdrew funds from Dixie's account to pay bills,
such as the lease payments of the Ford Fiesta automobile that
Darrell G. Hafen drives (D 31:5 to 32:7), to make "loans" to
family members (D 32:8-17), and to pay the personal traffic
tickets of Darrell G. Hafen (D 32:19-20); that there were no
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notes or other documents to evidence the alleged corporate
"loans" (D 32:23-30); and finally, that there was no interest due
on the alleged loans (D 33:1).
In 18 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations Section 52, page 857,
there is a checklist of 17 facts and circumstances tending to
show when a corporate president is the alter ego of the
corporation.

The above references to John Hafen's deposition

includes 13 of the 17 factors on that checklist.

Under these

circumstances, this case meets the test of this checklist and
also the test of Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Company
(Utah, 1979) 596 P.2d 1028 that (1) there must be such unity of
interest and ownership that the separate personalities of the
corporation and the individuals no longer exist, so that the
corporation is in fact the alter ego of one or a few individuals;
and (2) the observance of the corporate form would sanction a
fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result would follow.
The Court of Appeals has recently upheld the piercing
of the corporate veil in two cases where the circumstances were
not as compelling as this case.

First, in Walker v. Carlson 64

Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ct. App. 1987), four factors were listed as
sufficient grounds for piercing the corporate veil, namely, (1)
failure to issue stock; (2) failure to keep minutes; (3)
commingling funds; and (4) failure to capitalize.

All of these

factors exist in this case except possibly the first.

John Hafen

testified to the alleged stock ownership, but no certificates
were produced.
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In the second case, Colman v. Colman 67 Utah Adv. Rep.
7 (Ct. App. 1987) , the court said that:
"It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove actual
fraudf but must only show that failure to pierce the
corporate veil would result in an injustice."
The court then listed eight factors that should be considered
(among others), in determining if this test has been met. Of
those 8 factors, seven can be found in the deposition of John
Hafen alone. Only the nonpayment of dividends is not covered by
the deposition, as that question was not asked.

The court found

six of the eight factors to exist in Colman, and upheld the
piercing of the corporate veil.

A close reading of that opinion

will show that more effort was made in that case to observe
corporate formalities than in this case. Transamerica has
certainly met the standard for appellate review set forth in
Colman that ". . .the trial court's decision to pierce the
corporate veil will be upheld if there is substantial evidence in
favor of the judgment."

There can be no doubt that Dixie is

simply the alter ego of Hafen.
Even in the pleadings, Dixie and Hafen have virtually
admitted that Dixie is nothing more than the pocketbook of Hafen.
In seeking a continuance for the trial, Dixie filed the affidavit
of its attorney (R 368-369), Scott Gubler, stating that Hafen was
being held in custody on a federal conviction in Massachusetts,
and that Hafen had told him that he could not afford to travel to
Utah for the trial "because of lack of funds in that Plaintiff
(Transamerica) has attached all traveling funds which would have
been available to Darrell G. Hafen for traveling purposes."
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If

the funds were not Hafen's funds they would not have been
available to him.

That statement appears to be what one might

call a "freudian slip"—an admission that the court's ruling was
indeed correct.
Dixie concedes that under certain circumstances a
creditor can pierce the corporate veil and hold an individual
stockholder liable for the debts of the corporation.

Dixie,

however, argues that the reverse is not permissable, i.e., that
one cannot apply the alter ego theory to hold the corporation
(or its assets) liable for the debts of the individual, or, as
some have termed it, to pierce the corporate veil "backwards".
While this situation is not nearly so common, it
nevertheless is a proper application of the alter ego doctrine.
Initially, it might be said that common sense would tell us that
if an individual can be held for the debts of a corporation, a
corporation (in proper circumstances) can be held for the debts
of an individual.
the same thing.

More persuasively, perhaps, the cases also say
In fact, the Colman case was such a case, which

held the corporation's assets subject to and included in a
divorce settlement agreement.
In Dockstader v. Walker 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P.2d 526,
at page 528, the proper use of the "alter ego" doctrine is
explained as follows:
"The term "alter ego" is used to describe a situation
where the courts go behind the corporate entity and
hold a stockholder liable for the debts of the
corporation or to hold that it is the stockholder and
not the corporation which owns the assets.
The doctrine is generally applied to situations known
as fone-man corporations1, i.e., where one man owns
practically all of the stock, either directly or
26

through others who hold it for his use and benefit, and
where the stockholder uses the corporation as a shield
to protect him from debts or wrongdoings." (Emphasis
Supplied).
Thus, Utah has consistently recognized that the
corporate entity can be pierced "backwards".

In the instant

case, Hafen has used Dixie to hold his assets to protect them
from his personal "debts and wrongdoings".

The doctrine of

piercing of the corporate veil can be applied "backwards" to
place liability on the corporate entity for debts owed by one who
controls and dominates the corporation.

See Reynolds Pallet &

Box Co. v. N.L.R.B., 324 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1963); Goldberg v.
Engelberg, 34 Cal. App. 2d 10, 92 P.2d 935 (1939).
Typical of such cases, is the case of Grotheer v. Meyer
Rosenberg, Inc., (Calif., 1936) 53 P.2d 996.

It is a 1936 case

that has been cited several times for the proposition of piercing
the corporate veil "backwards".

It is discussed here because it

is almost on "all fours" with the instant case.

In that case,

plaintiffs sought to hold the defendant, Meyer Rosenberg, Inc.
liable for the payment of a money judgment previously obtained by
plaintiffs against Meyer Rosenberg, individually, upon the ground
said corporation was the alter ego of Meyer Rosenberg, the
individual.

Plaintiffs obtained a writ of attachment at the

commencement of the action and caused it to be levied on the
corporate bank account, just as was done in the instant case.
The corporation moved to dissolve the attachment and it was
dissolved.

Plaintiffs appealed, and the court reversed,

reinstating the writ of attachment.

The appellate court noted

that it was alleged that Meyer Rosenberg had transferred all his
21

property to the corporation to place that property beyond
plaintiffs1 reach, so that plaintiffs' claim, or judgment, could
not be satisfied.

On page 998, the court said:

"If the foregoing allegations are true, then Meyer
Rosenberg, Inc., is doubtless liable for the debts of
Meyer Rosenberg individually, for it is well settled
that inasmuch as the separate personality or capacity
of a corporation is but a statutory privilege, it must
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a
cloak or disguise for the evasion of contracts or other
obligations; . . . The separateness of the person and
the corporation would of course be recognized if no
inequitable results would follow. But, where, as here,
an inequitable result would follow, the two should be
considered as one, . . . "
(Emphasis Added).
This case not only held that the alter ego doctrine can
be applied "backwards", but that attachment of the allegedly
corporate assets was appropriate.
In Wilson v. Stearns, (Calif., 1954) 267 P.2d 59,
Wilson, a real estate broker, had an agreement with Stearns, a
subdivider and builder of homes on tract properties, to sell
Steam's property.

Later, Stearns transferred the land to a

corporation, Alamo Development Company, which developed the
property.

Wilson assisted in the sales, but was not paid.

The issue pertinent here, that was raised there, was whether
Alamo Development Company, which had signed no agreement with
Wilson, could be held liable for Stern's personal debts.
The court, after reviewing the facts which justified a
finding that Stearns and Alamo were one and the same—that Alamo
was the alter ego of Stearns—held at page 68:
"The foregoing recital of evidence convinces us that
there were here present all the necessary elements to
constitute an alter ego relationship between George
Stearns and Alamo Development Company, the corporation,
namely, (1) control of the corporation by Stearns; (2)
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that the corporation was but the mere conduit of the
business of Stearns; (3) that recognition of the
separate existence of the corporation would sanction a
fraud and permit oppression and injustice."
The court held that the two should be considered as one
and allowed Wilson to recover from Alamo, the corporationf for
the debt of Stearns, the individual.

Regarding the standard of

review and the alter ego doctrine, the court said:
"The trial court was the judge of the value and effect
of evidence challenging the verity of the testimony
here narrated. The separate personality or capacity of
a corporation being but a statutory privilege, it must
not be utilized for fraudulent purposes, such as a
cloak or disguise for the evasion of contracts or other
obligations. The evidence here strongly points to the
conclusion that the corporation was distinctly a
one-man corporation. Where it appears that a
corporation is being used merely as an instrumentality
through which an individual who is the owner of its
capital stock transacts his business, and where an
inequitable result would ensue, the two should be
considered as one."
The court also pointed out, at page 69, that:
"It is not necessary that the plaintiff prove actual
fraud. It is enough if the recognition of the two
entities as separate would result in an injustice."
(Emphasis Added).
In the instant case, whether there is a showing of
fraud or not is unimportant, just that an injustice would occur,
i.e., that Hafen could steal large sums of money from
Transamerica, as he has been convicted of doing, but could defeat
efforts to recover some or all of the money by putting his own
assets in a corporation which the court has already determined is
nothing but his alter ego.

It should not matter, as far as

justice and equity are concerned, whether it is the same money,
or whether it is other funds legitimately belonging to Hafen that
are attached.
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State ex. rel. Christensen v. Nugget Coal Co. (Wyo.
1944) 144 P.2d 944, dealt with an attempt by the organizers of a
corporation to avoid a workman's compensation obligation of their
predecessor partnership.

On pages 949-50, the court, quoting

from an earlier case, adopted as its own, the following:
" 'It is now so well established that it has become
almost aphoristic that upon a proper showing that a
corporation is but an instrumentality through which its
owner or substantial owners for convenience transacts
or transact his or their business, by the great weight
of authority, both equity and law will look through the
form to its substance and will hold such corporation
bound as the owner of the corporation might be bound or
conversely hold the owner bound by acts which bind his
corporation. And so, where an individual owns all of
the stock of a corporation or substantially so, and
that the corporation is in truth and in fact, but the
juristic double of its owner and where fraud or
injustice will likely operate to the injury of third
persons, this situation suffices to dissipate the
separate fictional identity of the corporation and the
law will have no compunction in holding the corporation
liable for the acts of its owners or vice versa. And
this rule is the same though the stock of the
corporation is owned by two or more who act in
conjunction with the corporate organization. (Citations
omitted.) Actual intent to defraud is not necessary.
It is sufficient if the refusal to recognize the fact
of the identity of the corporate existence with that of
the individual would bring about an inequitable result.
(Emphasis Added).
Finally, after holding the corporation liable for the
debt of the individual partnership, the court in Christensen made
the following observations at page 952:
"It has been held that 'the conditions under which the
corporate entity may be disregarded, or the corporation
be regarded as the alter ego of the stockholders,
necessarily vary according to the circumstances in each
case inasmuch as the doctrine is essentially an
equitable one and for that reason is particularly
within the province of the trial court."
Plaintiffs submit that the ruling of the district court
in the instant case was proper and that the alter ego principal,
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of piercing the corporate veil "backwards" to hold the
corporation liable for the individual debts of the person
controlling and dominating the corporation, in the appropriate
circumstances shown here, is just as appropriate as the common
practice of piercing the corporate veil to hold an individual
liable for a corporate debt in the proper circumstances.

III.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISSOLVING THE FIRST
WRIT OF ATTACHMENT. PERSONAL SERVICE WAS
NOT NECESSARY BECAUSE DEFENDANTS1 MADE A GENERAL
APPEARANCE BY COUNSEL. IN ANY EVENT, THE SECOND
WRIT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED, SERVED, AND MAINTAINED.
The district court dissolved the first writ of

attachment on the grounds (R 167-168) "That notice was not
properly served as required by Rule 64A(7) upon defendant
corporation, Dixie Power and Water, Inc."

Said rule provides as

follows:
"(7) Any notice required under this Rule shall be in
such form and served in such manner as will
expeditiously give the adverse party actual notice of
the proceeding, all as directed by the court."
Only actual notice is required, personal service on the
registered agent, president, or secretary of Dixie, is not the
only way to give actual notice. As long as Dixie had actual
notice of the attachment, and of the hearing to be held thereon,
so that it could appear and defend, that is all that is
necessary.

The record shows that not only Dixie, but all

defendants, had actual notice of the attachment and of the
hearing because all the defendants made appearances in the
matter.

The record shows that Hafen contacted the court and

Transamerica1s attorney and requested a continuance of the
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hearing (R 37-38) , which was granted.

Although this contact was

by telephone, and not in person, it shows that Hafen had actual
notice of the attachment and of the hearing to be held thereon.
Next, all defendants sought and were granted another continuance,
this time through an attorney, Fay E. Reber (R 50-51) . John
Hafen, the alleged secretary of Dixie, was personally served with
a subpoena to appear at the next hearing (R 65-66) scheduled for
April 13, 1982. At that hearing Dixie appeared by attorney Scott
A. Gubler.

The matter was continued to May 10, 1982 when the

hearing was held (R 69), and the matter continued to June 8,
1982, when the district court ruled that the writ should be
dissolved.
A voluntary appearance by a party is sufficient to give
the court jurisdiction over him.
it is still valid.
82 L.Ed. 649, 1938).

This was the ancient law, and

(Adam v. Saenger 303 U.S. 59, 58 S.Ct. 454,
The record shows that the money on deposit

at First Security Bank was attached and later deposited with the
Clerk of the court, who has placed the funds in an interest
bearing account.

The bank was properly served and the return of

service is in the court file (R 32-35).

There can be no doubt

that the court has jurisdiction of the property, in this case,
money.

Kramer v. Pixton 72 Utah 1, 268 P. 1029 states the

well-known rule regarding personal jurisdiction on page 1031:
"Personal service of summons, or a general appearance
in an action by attorney or otherwise, is universally
held to give a court jurisdiction of the person of a
defendant."
The law in Utah is that an appearance solely to seek a
continuance is a general appearance subjecting that party to the
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in personam jurisdiction of the court.

This long-established

rule was reiterated by the Utah Supreme Court in Cooke v. Cooke
(Utah, 1926) 248 P. 83, where the court stated, on page 106:
"An application for an extension of time to plead is a
recognition of the jurisdiction of the court over the
person and constitutes a general appearance."
The court went on to say that this general appearance cannot be
limited in effect or scope by any statement on the part of
counsel.
Accordingly, the district court erred when it dissolved
the first writ of attachment because the defendants all had
actual notice of the writ and of the hearings.

By dissolving the

writ, the district court possibly subjected Transamerica to a
claim for damages.
As soon as the court dissolved the first writ,
Transamerica immediately move for a new writ of attachment
(R152-154), which the court held under advisement until it
finally granted a new writ on October 15, 1982. The request for
a new writ of attachment was made in open court on July 14, 1982
(Tl pp. 4 & 5), so it was not issued without notice. A new
undertaking was obtained (R 181), the writ was served (R
197-199) , and notices of the hearing on the writ were given to
all parties (192-196) , the hearing was held (R 216-217) and the
writ continued in effect until summary judgment was granted.
There have been no defects in the second writ, and, of course, by
the time this second writ issued, the court had already ruled (R
171) that Dixie was the alter ego of Hafen, so Dixie cannot be
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heard to complain that its funds were unlawfully attached, as the
funds actually belonged to Hafen.
Defendants were all personally served on June 10, 1982
(R 96-98) , filed their answer (R 99-103) and an "Ex Parte Motion
For Stay" (R 104) on June 27, 1982f so no complaint can be made
about the hearing after that date.
Both writs were issued based upon the verified
complaint (R 1-27) , which more than adequately alleges that Dixie
was the mere alter ego of Hafen and clearly sets forth the
specific facts showing that immediate injury, loss, or damage
would result.

Had Transamerica proceeded by complaint and

motion, Hafen would have moved the funds at his bank in the blink
of an eye.

After having taken Transamerica to the tune of

$394,380.75, Transamerica had to act quickly and without notice
to attach funds whereever it could find them.

The remedy of a

prejudgment writ of attachment was designed and intended for
situations like the one presented here.

There was no error in

issuing the writs of attachment.

IV.

AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN CANNOT BE IMPRESSED ON FUNDS
THAT DO NOT BELONG TO THE ATTORNEY'S CLIENT.
On June 8, 1982 the district court ruled that Dixie

Power And Water, Inc. was the alter ego of Defendant Darrell G.
Hafen and that the assets of Dixie were, in fact, the assets of
Hafen.

This ruling was subsequently reduced to an "Order And

Judgment" dated July 14, 1982 (R. 171).
It was not until after this ruling that Scott A.
Gubler, Dixie's attorney, first filed a claim seeking an
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attorneyfs lien on the attached funds. The ruling was made June
8, 1982 and the alleged attorney's lien was first claimed three
days later on June 11, 1982 (R 93).

Mr. Gubler has never, at any

time in this case, represented the owner of the attached funds,
to-wit, Defendant Darrell G. Hafen.

He has only represented the

alter ego, the corporate shell called Dixie Power And Water, Inc.
Further, as of June 11, 1982 when the lien was claimed, Mr.
Gubler had not filed an answer containing a counterclaim nor had
there been a verdict, report, decision or judgment in Dixie's
favor.

Under these circumstances, the Utah attorney's lien

statute does not allow an attorney's lien.
Section 78-51-41, UCA, 1953, as amended, provides in
part that:
"From the commencement of an action or the service of
an answer containing a counterclaim, the attorney who
appears for a party has a lien upon his client's cause
of action or counterclaim, which attaches to a verdict,
report, decision, or judgment in his client's favor .
. . " (Emphasis Added).
The statute lays down two requirements, neither of
which are met in this case.

First, an attorney's lien attaches,

in the case of defendant's attorney, only after the service of an
answer containing a counterclaim.

Mr. Gubler did not file a

counterclaim until December 12, 1982 and then only to correct
this defect.

Until then, his efforts had been limited to

attempts to secure the release of the funds attached.

However,

this was some six months after this Court ruled the assets did
not belong to his client.

Second, there must be a decision or

judgment in his client's favor.

His client is Dixie Power And

Water, Inc. and no decision or judgment in favor of Dixie has
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ever been made.

The ruling that the assets of Dixie were, in

fact, the assets of Hafen and a decision against Mr. Gubler's
client.

This was a finding that Darrell G. Hafen owned the

assets (bank account) which was attached.

Dixie has been found

by the district court not to own the attached funds. Mr.
Gubler's attorney's lien cannot be asserted against funds not
owned by his client.
In Lundeberg v. Dastrup v. Husbands 28 Utah 2d 28, 497
P.2d 648, after citing the attorney's lien statute, the court
said:
"The lien which this statute gives the attorney is upon
his client's cause of action and/or the judgment; and
with respect thereto he stands in no better position
than his client. For the same reasons stated above,
indicating that the plaintiffs' judgment does not run
against either Alyce Husbands or Mick Caravelli, any
lien the plaintiffs attorney may have thereon is
likewise not effective against them."
Dixie has no final judgment in its favor in this matter
as it pertains to the attached funds. Mr. Gubler's lien cannot
attach to assets not owned by his client.

In 7 Am.Jur. 2d

Attorneys At Law Section 315, page 332, it states, in reference
to attorney's liens, that "Its existence depends on possession by
the attorney of money or property of his client.", and cites
Midvale Motors, Inc. v. Saunders 21 Utah 2d 181, 442 P.2d 938, a
case in which the Utah Supreme Court said:
"It is to be noted that the statute above set out gives
to an attorney what is called a charging lien which
attaches to a verdict, report, decision or judgment in
his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof, etc.
(emphasis original). At the time of the order
purportedly giving liens to the attorney, the plaintiff
had no verdict, report, decision, nor judgment in his
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favor, andf of course, he had no proceeds therefrom.
The statute gives a lien to the attorney on the fruits
of his labor so as to protect him against an unjust
enrichment on the part of a nonpaying client."
As this case illustrates, there can be no attorney's
lien because (1) there are no assets of Dixie Power And Water,
Inc. to which it could attach; and (2) there is no decision or
judgment in favor of Mr. Gubler's client.
An additional point precluding this attorneyfs lien is
the absence of a cause of action to which it may attach.

In 7

Am. Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, Section 339, pages 347-48 it
states, again citing Midvale Motors, supra, that:
"It is said that an attorney's charging lien attaches
to the fruits of his skill and labor. If the
attorney's work is sterile and produces no fruit, then
he has no lien. . . . The statute may provide that
the lien shall attach from the date of filing suit, the
time of commencement of the action, or the time of
service of summons. In the case of the attorney for
the defense, it may provide that his lien attaches on
service of an answer containing a counterclaim."
The Utah statute, quoted above, provides that the lien
of an attorney for a defendant attaches only on ". . .the service
of an answer containing a counterclaim."

Mr. Gubler had not

filed an answer containing a counterclaim, or even an answer, on
behalf of his client before the pivotal decision of June 8, 1982
as to who owned the attached funds, and does not fit the
statutory definition of attorneys entitled to the lien.
A fourth, and final, reason to deny the lien is that
Utah law requires the attorney to bring a separate action against
his client to determine the amount of the lien.

In 7 Am. Jur. 2d

Attorneys At Law, Section 345, page 351, it states:
"It has been held that an attorney's lien on property
recovered may, on application to the court, be enforced
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in the original action in which the services were
rendered. . . .
On the other hand, the rule of some
courts is that, in the absence of special circumstances
requiring a contrary holding to prevent injustice,
counsel must bring a separate action against his client
to determine the amount of his fee and to foreclose his
charging lien if he has any."
Utah law follows the latter rule, requiring a separate
action to be brought.

As stated in Midvale Motors, supra, at

page 941:
"While there is authority to the effect that an
attorney's lien on property recovered in an action may
on application to the court be enforced in the original
matter (see 7 Am.Jur. 2d, Attorneys At Law, § 302), we
think the better rule, in the absence of special
circumstances requiring a contrary holding to prevent
injustice, is to require counsel to bring a separate
action against his client to determine the amount of
his fee and to foreclose his charging lien if any he
has."
Mr. Gubler's alleged lien is improper under the Utah
statute because (1) the assets he is attempting to lien do not
belong to his client; (2) there has been no decision or judgment
in favor of his client; (3) no answer containing a counterclaim
was filed by Mr. Gubler before this Court determined the assets
belonged to Darrell G. Hafen; and (4) no separate action has been
brought to determine his lien, if any.

V.

THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AS THERE WERE NO ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT AND
SECTION 76-3-201.2 OF THE UTAH CODE OPERATES
TO CONCLUSIVELY DETERMINE LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES.
Dixie argues that there was no basis to grant summary

judgment because there were material issues of fact, but Dixie's
brief fails to set forth any facts that Dixie contends were
material or that were in dispute.
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The only specific item

mentioned in Dixie's brief is the allegation that there was no
proof that would permit the court to find fraud by Dixie in its
orgainization or operations. As has been discussed in Point II,
supray in order to apply the alter ego doctrine, it is not
necessary for a court to find fraud in the organization or
operation of a corporation—it is sufficient if the court finds
there is a unity of interest or ownership or that one person
dominates or controls the corporation and that observance of the
corporate form would sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or
allow an inequitable result. Any of the three is sufficient, but
in the instant case, all three are present.
As to any doubt about the liability of defendant
Darrell G. Hafen in this matter, he was convicted in the United
States District Court, District of Massachusetts, in Criminal No.
82 00053, of 19 counts of mail fraud on the same deposits and
redemptions pertaining to this matter. Certified copies of his
conviction are part of the record on this appeal (R 476-503) .
The standard of proof in the criminal matter (beyond a reasonable
doubt) is much higher than the standard in this civil action.
The court found that Hafen has admitted his signatures on the
checks in this matter (R 346-347) by failing to establish a
defense as required by Section 70A-3-307(2) of the Utah Code.
Liability was properly established.
Plaintiff's Exhibits 1, 3, and 4 establish the amount
of damages. No dispute has ever been made as to the amount
established by these exhibits.
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Further, Section 76-3-201.2(2) of the Utah Code,
provides:
"If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides
the issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary
damages of a victim, that issue is conclusively
determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a
subsequent civil action." (Emphasis Added).
Hafen's liability is therefore conclusively determined.

There

was no error in granting the summary judgment.

CONCLUSION
The summary judgment order of the district court should
be affirmed.

Also, the Supreme Court should rule that the

district court erred when it dissolved the first writ of
attachment, because the defendants had actual notice of the writ
and the hearing thereon.

This ruling should be made to preclude

the subsequent filing of a lawsuit for damages by defendants.
Respectfully submitted this 14th day of December, 1987.

)HN L. MILES
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Respondents
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